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Child protection workers frequently violate the rights of both par-
ents and child when they remove a child from his or her home.' Vio-
lations of statutory or constitutional requirements sometimes sur-
face in judicial proceedings months or even years after a change in
custody.- At that time it may no longer be in the child's best in-
terests to be returned to his or her original parents. Courts, how-
ever, lack any effective remedy for the violation of parental rights
other than restoring the child to the parents. 3 As a result, courts fre-
quently must choose between rectifying the wrong done to the par-
ents and serving the best interests of the child. Too often, the child is
used as damages by courts justifiably outraged by the actions of child
protection workers.4
States should enact legislation permitting parents and children who
have been separated through defective proceedings to recover money
damages from the state and its subdivisions. The claim for damages
and the question of appropriate custody should be decided in sep-
arate judicial proceedings. Distinct treatment of these two issues will
provide the parents some relief for the violation of their rights and
also serve the best interests of the child.
I. The States' Child Protection Systems
State child protection statutes authorize child protection workers
to remove a child from his or her home under a variety of circum-
stances. In removing the child from the home, workers sometimes
violate the statutory and constitutional rights of parents and chil-
dren. When a significant period of time intervenes between custody
I. Child protection workers, guided by vague statutory standards as to what consti-
tutes abuse or neglect, see note 32 infra, often remove children unnecessarily from their
homes. See note 39 infra. These substantively wrong decisions are often tainted with
class and race prejudice, see note 38 infra, and deny parents and children their right to
family integrity, see note 6 inIra, without due process, see, e.g., In re Daniel C., 47 A.D.2d
160, 365 N.Y.S.2d 535 (1975) (city child care agency illegally retained custody of two
children for 27 months); In re Suzanne Y., 92 Misc. 2d 652, 401 N.Y.S.2d 383 (Fam. Ct.
1977) (parental rights terminated without proper notice).
2. See, e.g., Sorentino v. Family & Children's Soc'y, 72 N.J. 127, 367 A.2d 1168 (1976)
(reviewing circumstances of "voluntary" surrender after 31 months); In re Suzanne Y.,
92 Misc. 2d 652, 401 N.Y.S.2d 383 (Fam. Ct. 1977) (reviewing facts of removal after five
years of continued separation).
3. See pp. 690-96 infra (discussing inadequacies of current remedies).
4. See, e.g., In re Leon RR, 48 N.Y.2d 117, 397 N.E.2d 374, 421 N.Y.S.2d 863 (1979);
In re Sanjivini K., 47 N.Y.2d 374, 391 N.E.2d 1316, 418 N.Y.S.2d 339 (1979).
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termination and judicial recognition that rights have been violated,
courts face a difficult dilemma in fashioning a remedy that serves
the interests of both the parents and the child.
A. Child Protection Laws and Procedures
Parents have a constitutionally protected liberty interest in the
care and custody of their minor children.- In addition, courts have
recently recognized a fundamental right to family integrity that in-
cludes the reciprocal rights of parents and children to be free of
unjustified state interference in the family unit.0 These rights, how-
ever, are qualified by the state's interest as parens patriae7 in pro-
tecting children who are neglected or abused by their parents or
g-uardians." In order to accommodate these conflicting rights and
interests, every state has established procedures for determining when
and under what conditions a child may be removed from the cus-
tody of his or her parents.9
5. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972); cI. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205,
232 (1972) ("The history and culture of Western civilization reflect a strong tradition of
parental concern for the nurture and upbringing of their children. This primary role
of the parents in the upbringing of their children is now established beyond debate as
an enduring American tradition.")
6. See, e.g., Duchesne v. Sugarman, 566 F.2d 817, 825 (2d Cir. 1977) (family integrity
encompasses "the interest of the parent in the 'companionship, care, custody and man-
agement of his or her children' . . . and of the children in not being dislocated from the
'emotional attachments that derive from the intimacy of daily association,' with the par-
ent"); Roe v. Conn, 417 F. Supp. 769, 777 (M.D. Ala. 1976) ("Constitution recognizes as
fundamental the right of family integrity"); Alsager v. District Court, 406 F. Stipp. 10, 15-16
(S.D. Iowa 1975), a'd, 545 F.2d 1137 (8th Cir. 1976) (same). See generally Developments
in the Law-the Constitution and the Family, 93 HARV. L. RaV. 1156, 1235-38 (1980)
(discussing constitutional bases for right of family integrity) [hereinafter cited as Develop.
ments-the Family]; Note, Constitutional Limitations on the Scope of State Child Neglect
Statutes, 79 COLUM. L. REv. 719, 722-27 (1979) (same).
7. Parens patriae, literally "parent of the country," was explained by the English
Chancery Court in the following manner: "Every loyal subject is taken to be within the
King's protection, for which reason it is, that idiots and lunatics, who are uncapable
to take care of themselves, are provided for by the King as pater Patriae, and there is
the same reason to extend this care to infants." Eyre v. Shaftsbury, 24 Eng. Rep. 659,
664 (Ch. 1722). For the history of the parens Patriae doctrine from sixteenth-century
England to the American present, see Areen, Intervention Between Parent and Child:
A Reappraisal of the State's Role in Child Neglect and Abuse Cases, 63 GEo. L.J. 887,
894-917 (1975); Developments-the Family, supra note 6, at 1221-27.
8. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 652 (1972) ("We do not question the assertion that
neglectful parents may be separated from their children."); Note, The Right to Family
Integrity: A Substantive Due Process Approach to State Removal and Termination Pro-
ceedings, 68 GEO. L.J. 213, 214 (1979) (state's concern for welfare of its citizens justifies
intervention in family affairs).
9. See Katz, Howe, & McGrath, Child Neglect Laws in America, 9 FAm. L.Q. 1 (1975)
(surveying child neglect statutes of 50 states, District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and Virgin
Islands, as amended through August 31, 1974); Comment, The Rights of Children: A
Trust Model, 46 FORDHAm L. RaV. 669, 720 n.48 (1978) (citing state child neglect statutes).
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Typically, the process of removing a child from his or her home
begins with a complaint to a state or local office charged with in-
vestigating child neglect and abuse.' 0 The complaint may be made
by neighbors, health workers, family members, or social workers."
Once a complaint has been made, an investigation of the family situa-
tion is usually conducted.' 2 If appropriate, the child protection work-
er may recommend intervention that ranges from counseling to re-
moving the child from the home.13 If the parents refuse to comply
with the child protection worker's recommendations,' 4 the state may
petition a court 3 to declare that the child is neglected or abused.' 6
10. See S. KArz, WHEN PARENTS FAIL 22-51 (1971) (describing child protection process):
Wald, State Intervention on Behalf of "iNeglected" Children: Standards for Removal of
Children from their Homes, Monitoring the Status of Children in Foster Care, and Ter-
mination of Parental Rights, 28 STAN. L. Ray. 623, 628-36 (1976) (same).
11. In most states, physicians, nurses, social workers, teachers, and other professionals
have an express statutory duty to report suspected cases of abuse or neglect. See, e.g.,
MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 119, § 51A (Michie/Law. Co-op Supp. 1980); N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW
§ 413 (McKinney Supp. 1980).
12. See Levine, Caveat Parens: A Demystification of the Child Protection System, 35
U. Pirr. L. REV. 1L I1 (1973) (child protection investigations are typically very informal
and unstructured). Many complaints made to child protection agencies do not ultimately
lead to the removal of the child from the home. See id. at 9 ("Many reports of suspected
deprivation prove to be unfounded.") (footnote omitted). As explained by Sanford Kat7,
the decision to report instances of neglect to an agency may relate more to economic,
ethnic, or personal factors than to legally recognized standards. Indeed, the reports
may be used by a separated spouse to continue and compound marital difficulties,
by a neighbor trying to get a fellow neighbor jailed or evicted from a housing project,
or among relatives and neighbors to generally resolve personal antagonisms.
S. Kiz, supra note 10, at 28.
13. Wald, supra note 10, at 630. Theoretically, a child should be removed from his
or her home only as a last resort, when in-home remedial services have been offered
unsuccessfully. See, e.g., MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 119, § I (Michie/Law. Co-op 1975) (sub-
stitute care of children should be provided "only when the family itself or the resources
available to the family are unable to provide the necessary care and protection to insure
the rights of any child to sound health and normal physical, mental, spiritual and
moral development"); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4C-1(b) (West 1964) ("[p]revention and cor-
rection of dependency and delinquency among children should be accomplished so far
as practicable through welfare services which will seek to continue the living of such
children in their own homes .... ")
14. Parents are often under considerable pressure to comply with the child protection
worker's suggestions. See Levine, supra note 12, at 11 (parent may misconceive power or
role of investigator, believing, for example, that continued welfare benefits are contingent
on compliance with worker's suggestions).
15. See Mnookin, Child Custody Adjudications: Judicial Functions in the Face of In-
determinacy, LAW , CONTEMP. PROB., Summer 1975, at 226, 240 (family or juvenile court
usually has jurisdiction in neglect proceedings).
16. Abuse and neglect are variously defined and are difficult to distinguish. One com-
mentator has offered the following definitions:
Abuse generally covers physical and emotional injury. Physical injury includes both
beatings and sexual misuse; it denotes the commission of an act or acts damaging to
a child's well-being.
Neglect is generally an omission: a failure to provide for a child's physical or emo-
tional needs or both. Neglect occurs if parents fail to adequately feed or clothe their
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Upon such a finding, often termed an adjudication of dependency,' 7
the court may order that the parents follow the child protection
worker's recommendations,' 8 or that the child be removed from the
home.19
The child protection worker has a great deal of discretion to de-
cide if and when a child should be removed from the home. The
worker decides when it is appropriate to petition a court to award
custody of the child to the state.2 0 In many states, a worker may re-
move a child from the home without prior judicial approval if he
or she determines that an emergency situation exists. 21 Once the
child has been committed to the custody of the child protection
agency, the worker has broad discretion to determine when the child
should be returned to the home.22 Finally, a child protection worker
child, and such failure is not a result of conditions beyond their control; or if parents
fail to adequately monitor their child's behavior-for example, by permitting him to
play on a street full of traffic or by leaving him unsupervised for long periods of time.
Bourne, Child Abuse and Neglect: An Overview, in CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON CHILD ABUSE
1, 2 (R. Bourne & E. Newberger eds. 1979).
17. See Note, supra note 8, at 225 n.106 ("dependency" most common ground for state
intervention in family).
18. See Wald, sukra note 10, at 630 (court may order parents to accept visits by public
health nurse, undergo counseling, participate in drug or alcohol treatment program, or
place child in day care).
19. See Areen, sukra note 7, at 928 (separation of child from his or her parents is most
common disposition following adjudication of neglect or abuse). Although statutes au-
thorize other dispositions, courts often order change in custody due to fear of adverse
publicity if a child is returned to his or her home and subsequently is injured. Id.
20. See S. KATZ, supra note 10, at 43 (agency decides to challenge parent's right to
custody on basis of its own investigation).
21. See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 305 (West Supp. 1980) (peace officer may
take minor into custody without warrant if there is reasonable cause to believe he or
she is neglected); N.Y. FA.i. CT. ACT § 1024 (McKinney Supp. 1980) (social workers, police,
or physicians may remove child without court order if there is imminent danger to child's
life or health).
22. See Wald, supra note 10, at 632 (most states lack statutory standards for determin-
ing when child is to be returned). State statutes that indicate when a child should be
returned merely provide that foster care should be continued as long as it is in the
child's best interests as determined by the agency. See, e.g., MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 119,
§ 26 (Michie/Law. Co-op 1975 & Supp. 1980) (court may commit child to custody of De-
partment of Public Welfare until age 18 or until, in department's opinion, object of
commitment has been accomplished).
While the child is in its custody, the agency also has broad discretion to determine
the conditions of his or her care. The agency may decide to place the child with his or
her relatives, in an institution, or in foster care. Foster placement in a private family
is the most frequent choice in the majority of jurisdictions. See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH,
EDUCATION, & WELFARE, CHILDREN SERVED BY PUBLIC WELFARE AGENCIES AND VOLUNTARY
CHILD WELFARE INSTITUTIONS (1973) (table 9) (approximately 75% of children removed
from parents are eventually placed in foster family homes). The agency has control over
the frequency and conditions of parental visits, letters, and phone calls. Visiting may be
severely limited. See Wald, supra note 10, at 632 n.37 (parents commonly restricted to one
visit per month or less).
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may initiate proceedings23 to eliminate the few rights parents re-
tain over a child in agency custody.24
B. Violations of Rights and Judicial Dilemmas
The child protection system has frequently been criticized for fail-
ing to improve the lives of the children who pass through it25 and
for violating the rights of families to be free of unjustified state
intervention.2 6 Child protection workers commonly intervene in fam-
ilies on the basis of scanty, unreliable evidence,27 cite conduct that
does not endanger the child as a reason for intervention,2 apply
improper pressures on parents they are investigating, 29 and fail to
23. See Wald, supra note 10, at 633 (proceedings to terminate parental rights au-
thorized by statute in all states). Courts may order termination based on an adjudication
of neglect, id. at 633-34 (12 states allow termination as disposition in neglect cases), or a
finding that a parent has failed to maintain contact with his or her child in foster care,
see, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4C-15 (West 1964) (termination allowed if parents fail to
maintain contact for one year); N.Y. FAr. CT. ACr § 614(d) (McKinney Supp. 1980) (same).
About half the states require that parental rights be terminated at a special proceeding
prior to an adoption proceeding. See, e.g., ARMz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-533 (Supp. 1980);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4C-15 (West 1964).
24. These include the right to inherit from the child and the right to withhold con-
sent to his or her marriage or military enlistment, see Wald, supra note 10, at 632, and
the right to petition the court for a restoration of custody, see Note, supra note 8, at 230.
25. Critics argue that children are commonly removed from their families when the
state cannot provide them with a better environment, and that, in fact, removing a child
from his or her parents often results in additional harm to the child. See Wald, supra
note 10, at 644-45 (child care experts consider foster care often worse alternative than
leaving child in home). Once a child is placed in foster care, it is likely that his or her
parental relationship will deteriorate significantly. See Levine, supra note 12, at 20-21
(agencies discourage parents from maintaining contact with children in foster care). More-
over, multiple foster home placements do not provide a child any security or the chance
to develop new attachments. See Wald, supra note 10, at 633 (majority of children in
placement remain in foster care for lengthy period without ties to parents and without
permanent home).
26. See, e.g., In re Suzanne Y., 92 Misc. 2d 652, 663, 401 N.Y.S.2d 383, 390 (Fain. Ct.
1977) (Garnstein, J.) ("[W]here we permit government-sanctioned agencies to make day
to day judgments on which families shall remain together or be torn apart according
to the value judgments of its concededly well intentioned workers, we approach . . .
tyranny .... "); Levine, supra note 12, at 8-13 (child protection workers intrude without
justification into families that cannot effectively resist); Note, supra note 8, at 223 (current
child welfare system fails to protect adequately family unit).
27. See Levine, supra note 12, at 9-10 (investigation is often undertaken on basis of
anonymous phone call).
28. See, e.g., Roe v. Conn, 417 F. Supp. 769 (M.D. Ala. 1976) (white mother and son
lived with black man in black neighborhood); In re Raya, 255 Cal. App. 2d 260, 63 Cal.
Rptr. 252 (1967) (parents not legally married); In re Yardley, 260 Iowa 259, 149 N.V.2d
162 (1967) (mother frequented taverns); cf. Developments-the Family, supra note 6, at
1317-18 (although most statutes allow finding of neglect based on parents' traits, deter-
minations of neglect should be based on child's condition rather than on parental
behavior).
29. See, e.g., Levine, supra note 12, at 12 (child protection workers use "aggressive
casework," that is, employ threats against parents to achieve their objectives); Wald,
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offer families social services as an alternative to removing the child
from the home.30 In addition, parents and children are often sep-
arated without being accorded constitutional due process or the bene-
fit of specific procedural protections created by state statutes.3 1
These abuses are attributable to a number of different factors.
Child protection workers are guided by vague statutory standards.3 2
Moreover, state and local child protection agencies are inadequately
funded33 and their staffs are usually overworked, undertrained, and
inexperienced.3 4 The most difficult and important decisions are often
made by the least experienced field workers.35 A third factor is that
the majority of child protection cases involve poor or nonwhite
people36 who differ in class, race, culture, and often language from
State Intervention on Behalf of "Neglected" Children: A Search for Realistic Standards,
27 STAN. L. REV. 985, 1006 (1975) (agencies pressure families to accept "voluntary" ser-
vices even though children are not suffering from harm cognizable under applicable
statutes).
30. See Note, supra note 8, at 229 ("little firm commitment [by government] to pro-
viding social services designed to reunify the family"); cf. Areen, supra note 7, at 917
(courts should use family therapy programs to treat neglectful parents rather than simply
remove child).
31. See, e.g., In re Daniel C., 47 A.D.2d 160, 365 N.Y.S.2d 535 (1975) (New York City
Bureau of Child Welfare retained custody of two children for 27 months without seeking
judicial approval required by state statute); In re Suzanne Y., 92 Misc. 2d 652, 401
N.Y.S.2d 383 (Fain. Ct. 1977) (parental rights terminated without required notice).
32. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-1-103(20) (1978) (grounds for state intervention
include parental "mistreatment or abuse," environment injurious to child's welfare, and
lack of proper parental care); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 119, § 24 (Michie/Law. Co-op Supp.
1980) (petition to commit child to state custody may be based on grounds that child is
"without necessary and proper physical, educational or moral care and discipline, or is
growing up under conditions or circumstances damaging to a child's sound character de-
velopment, or ... [is] lack[ing] proper attention of parent"); Wald, supra note 29, at 1000
("Most state statutes define neglect in broad, vague, language which would seem to allow
virtually unlimited intervention.") But ci. S. KATz, supra note 10, at 64-65 (vague laws
can be justified as necessary to enable judges to examine each situation on its own facts).
33. See CHILDREN'S BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, CHILD
WELFARE IN 25 STATEs-AN OVERVIEW at 11.56 (1976) (Pub. No. (OHD) 76-30090) (of 21 states
that expressed opinion in recent survey, 14 reported that financing of child welfare services
was generally inadequate; in two other states, funding was reported to be generally ade-
quate only for priority services).
34. See Campbell, The Neglected Child: His and His Family's Treatment under Massa-
chusetts Law and Practice and Their Rights Under the Due Process Clause, 4 SUFFOLK
U.L. REV. 631, 642 (1970) (study of Massachusetts Division of Child Guidance revealed
that few workers were over 26 years of age, and that most workers had only B.A. degrees,
usually in field other than psychology or social work); Note, supra note 8, at 239 (social
workers lack time to provide effective assistance to clients because of burdensome caseload).
35. See Campbell, supra note 34, at 644 (judgments of very inexperienced workers
often determine child's fate).
36. A study of neglect cases in Minneapolis and St. Paul, Minnesota, showed that
the educated, economically independent family is the rare exception among the neglect
referrals. The preponderance of the families referred for neglect come from the
lower socioeconomic strata of the community and differ markedly from the general
population in education, income, neighborhood, race and family structure. ...
In the general population, only 3% of families are dependent upon general re-
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the child protection worker who is investigating them.37 These cul-
tural differences allow ethnocentric biases concerning "good" child-
rearing practices to warp the child protection worker's perception of
the child's home situation.38
The broad discretion accorded child protection workers is common-
ly cited as the most important reason for substantively incorrect cus-
tody decisions.39 Many commentators have argued that the procedur-
al safeguards that protect family integrity should be strengthened, 40
lief or public assistance; in the neglect families, 42% receive assistance.
Boehm, The Community and the Social Agency Define Neglect, 43 CHILD WELFARE 453,
459 (1964); see J. GIOVANNONI & R. BECERRA, DEFINING CHILD ABUSE 165-66 (1979) (studies
in New York City and Massachusetts indicate racial minorities and poor are overrepre-
sented among neglectful families); Areen, supra note 7, at 889 n.7 (although child abuse
occurs in families of all income levels, proportionately more reported instances involve
low income families).
Richard Levine argues that these statistics reveal "that the poor, unlike their socio-
economic betters, are simply more vulnerable to agency intrusion and are not afforded
the luxury of the same familial autonomy." Levine, supra note 12, at 4-5. When poor
people accept government aid, they also accept scrutiny by government do-gooders and
watchdogs. On the other hand, Sanford Katz suggests that the poor are overrepresented
among families reported as neglectful because the poor are, in fact, more likely to abuse
their children. See S. KxTz, supra note 10, at 26-27 (because of "their own inability to
participate in the economic processes in society, their own feelings of inadequacy, and
society's reluctance to bear the responsibility for effectively meeting their needs," the
poor have "little to give to their children, both in terms of material things and emotional
strengths").
37. See Levine, supra note 12, at 14 (child protection workers are young, predominately
white, and "resoundingly middle class"); Wald, supra note 29, at 998 (percentage of mi-
nority workers in agencies is very low, although minorities are significant proportion of
clients in urban areas).
38. See Areen, supra note 7, at 888-89 (poverty of parents charged with neglect "raises
the troubling possibility that class or cultural bias plays a significant role in decisions to
label children neglected or abused"); Levine, supra note 12, at 16 ("It should be evident
that the sociocultural dissonance and inexpertise of the typical caseworker would result
in poor rapport with the parent even if their interests coincided."); Wald, supra note
29, at 998 ("[S]ocial work agencies apply middle-class standards to poor and minority parents
and attempt to change their lifestyles to meet middle-class norms.")
39. See, e.g., Levine, supra note 12, at 8 ("[U]nmonitored discretion . . . cloaked with
veil of benevolence invites arbitrary decisionmaking."); Wald, supra note 29, at 1001-02
(decisions by child protection workers "often reflect personal values about childrearing,
which are not supported by scientific evidence, and which result in removing children
from environments in which they are doing adequately") (footnote omitted).
40. See Campbell, supra note 34, at 667-69 (notice accorded parents who are subject
to neglect proceeding should be more specific); Levine, supra note 12, at 45-52 (proposing
that child welfare investigators be required to obtain search warrant prior to entering
home, that parents be accorded right to refuse to discuss inquiry with investigator, that
they be warned that anything they say may be used against them, and that parents have
right to consult attorney at any stage of investigation as well as right to court review).
The Institute of Judicial Administration-American Bar Association Joint Commission
on Juvenile Justice Standards recommends several layers of judicial protection to reduce
intrusion into the family, including a probable cause hearing on whether complaints
should be investigated and a requirement that the worker submit a plan of investigation
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and that the criteria for state intervention in the home should be
more specific. 41 The courts have invalidated several state child pro-
tection statutes on due process grounds.42 A number of states have
recently revised their child protection statutes to provide more spe-
cific guidance to child protection workers.43
But improving the rules will not ensure that the rules will be fol-
lowed. 44 Child protection workers frequently violate parents' and
children's constitutional and statutory rights by applying established
procedures improperly. Agencies have retained custody of children
for extended periods without seeking the judicial approval required
by state statutes. 45 Agencies also have frequently violated parents'
rights to notice and a fair hearing. 46
If such procedural violations are discovered long after the child has
to the court before he or she intervenes in the family. INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRA-
TION-AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS PROJECT, STANDARDS RE-
LATING TO ABUSE AND NEGLECT § 5.2 (Tent. Draft 1977). For a critique of these proposals,
see Lowry, The Judge v. The Social Worker: Can Arbitrary Decisionmaking be Tempered
by the Courts? 52 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1033 (1977).
41. See, e.g., J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD, & A. SOLNIT, BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE
CHILD 31-109 (1979) (state should intervene in family only in narrowly defined cases, for
instance, when parents request state to place child, when longtime caretakers wish to
become child's legal parents, when parents die, when parents are convicted of sexual
offense against child, when parents inflict, or allow to be inflicted, serious bodily harm
upon child, or when parents refuse to authorize lifesaving medical care) [hereinafter cited
as BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS]; INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMINIsTRATION-AMERICAN BAR As-
SOCIATION, JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS PROJECT, supra note 40, § 1.3, at 39-44 (Tent. Draft
1977) (comment) (statutory grounds for coercive intervention on behalf of endangered
children should be as specific as possible and should authorize intervention only when
child is suffering, or will imminently suffer, serious harm); Wald, supra note 10, at 700-01
(proposing that statutory grounds for intervention be limited to physical injury, serious
and untreated emotional damage, incest, serious lack of medical treatment, and delinquent
acts that result from parental encouragement).
42. See, e.g., Roe v. Conn, 417 F. Supp. 769, 778-80 (M.D. Ala. 1976) (invalidating
Alabama's termination statute for vagueness and for permitting terminations in cases in
which child is not subject to "real physical or emotional harm" and in which failure of
less drastic measures has not been demonstrated); Alsager v. District Court, 406 F. Supp.
10, 21-25 (S.D. Iowa 1975), affd, 545 F.2d 1137 (8th Cir. 1976) (invalidating Iowa's parental
rights termination statute on grounds that "clear and convincing" evidence of abuse or
neglect and notice reciting specific factual basis and legal standards for custody termi-
nation are required before parental rights may be terminated).
43. See, e.g., Act of June 20, 1978, ch. 334, § 1, 61 Del. Laws ch. 334, § I (codified
at DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 901(11) (Cum. Supp. 1980)) (providing detailed definition of
"neglected child"); Act of April 19, 1978, ch. 158, § 1, 1978 Kan. Sess. Laws 684 (codified
at KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-802(g) (Cum. Supp. 1979)) (narrowly defining "deprived child").
44. See BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS, supra note 41, at 18 ("[S]pecificity of statutory
language will never be enough to preclude unjustifiable invasions of family privacy ...
Nor will rules be enough to assure that those who unjustifiably violate family integrity
will be held accountable for their abuse of power.")
45. See In re Daniel C., 47 A.D.2d 160, 163, 365 N.Y.S.2d 535, 537 (1975) (New York
City Bureau of Child Welfare retained custody of two children for 27 months without
seeking required judicial approval).
46. See In re Suzanne Y., 92 Misc. 2d 652, 654, 401 N.Y.S.2d 383, 384 (Fain. Ct. 1977)
(mother not notified of termination hearing until day after it was held).
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been removed from the home,47 courts face a difficult dilemma. A
child separated from his or her parents faces significant trauma and
anxiety.48 A separation of even a few weeks can be extremely harm-
ful to his or her development. 49 However, a child also completes the
grieving and healing process in a much shorter period than an adult.50
If the child has been placed in a foster family after being taken
away from his or her parents, the child is likely to have formed
new attachments to the adults in the foster family.51 Thus, the child
may have gone through an intense grieving period and may have
begun again to relate in a loving way to those in his or her new
environment. Uprooting the child a second time is likely to be very
upsetting and may cause permanent psychological harm.52
47. See, e.g., Sorentino v. Family & Children's Soc'y, 72 N.J. 127, 128-29, 367 A.2d
1168, 1168-70 (1976) (reviewing circumstances of "voluntary" surrender after 31 months);
In re Suzanne Y., 92 Misc. 2d 652, 653-54, 401 N.Y.S.2d 383, 384-85 (Fam. Ct. 1977) (re-
viewing facts of removal after five years of continued separation).
48. See J. DUNN, DISTRESS AND COMFORT 73 (1977) ("When young children have to
spend time away from their families . . . nearly all of them show immediate distress.
Very often this is followed by a period of apathetic misery, and for some children there
is a later stage of apparent 'detachment' from their parents."); cf. Wald, supra note 10, at
645 (children often view foster home placement as punishment, and often experience
identity problems, conflicts of loyalty, and anxiety about their future).
49. According to one authority,
States of anxiety and depression that occur during adult years, and also psychopathic
conditions, can ...be linked in a systematic way to the states of anxiety, despair,
and detachment ... that are so readily engendered whenever a young child is sepa-
rated for long from his mother figure, whenever he expects such a separation, and
when ... he loses her altogether.
J. BOWLBY, ATrACHMENT AND Loss 4-5 (1973). The period of separation that will harm
a child depends upon his or her age, among other factors. See J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD, &
A. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 42 (1973) ("[T]he younger the child,
the shorter is the interval before leave-taking will be experienced as a permanent loss
.... ") [hereinafter cited as BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS]; R. PATRON & L. GARDNER, GROWTH
FAILURE IN MATERNAL DEPRIVATION 38 (1963) ("The gravest effects of separation are seen
between the ages of three months and two years, and then gradually decrease in severity
until the age of seven or eight when the child is able to tolerate long periods of
separation without any lasting major damage to personality structure.") (footnote omitted).
50. See Freud & Burlingham, Infants Vithout Families: Reports on the Hampstead
Nurseries, in 3 THE WRITINGS OF ANNA FREUD 1, 183 1973).
Observers seldom appreciate the depth and seriousness of this grief of a small child.
Their judgment of it is misled for one main reason. This childish grief is short-
lived. Mourning of equal intensity in an adult person would have to run its course
throughout a year; the same process in the child between I and 2 years will nor-
mally be over in 36 to 48 hours. It is a psychological error to conclude from this
short duration that the reaction is only a superficial one and can be treated lightly.
Id.
51. Indeed, to cope with the desolation that he or she feels at the loss of the parents,
a child may desperately reach out to the new adult caretaker. See BEYOND THE BEST
INTERESTS, supra note 49, at 40-41 ("[Nlew adult who cares for the child's physical needs
is latched onto, quickly, as the potential psychological parent.") (footnote omitted).
52. The caretaking adults who replaced the child's original parents will eventually
become the psschological parents. If the child's relationship of trust and love is broken
for a second time, the child may face severe difficulty in forming new emotional rela-
tionships. See BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS, supra note 49, at 32-33.
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As a result, courts currently face a difficult choice. On the one
hand, returning the child to the original parents is likely to cause
grave psychological injury to the child. On the other hand, parents
are entitled to some relief if they have been deprived of fair pro-
cedures. At present, the law fails to provide a just alternative to a
choice that sacrifices either the child's or the parents' interests.
II. Current Remedies: Description and Critique
An appropriate remedy for improper custody terminations should
satisfy several criteria. The remedy should compensate parents and
children for the emotional trauma that they have suffered and for
the deprivation of their statutory or constitutional rights. It should
deter child protection workers from further violations of established
procedures. It should also serve as symbolic recognition that the
parents and children were wronged.53 Finally, the remedy for im-
proper government intervention in the parent-child relationship should
serve the best interests of the child.54 Remedies currently available
to the courts fail to satisfy these criteria.
A. Returning the Child to the Original Home
Parents whose rights have been violated by child protection work-
ers through improper custody terminations commonly seek their child's
return as relief. This may occur in a variety of procedural contexts.
For example, parents may seek a writ of habeas corpus in order to
regain custody of their child from a state agency. 5 When parents
appeal an adjudication of neglect that led to loss of custody, they
may argue that their child should be returned because of violations
of their rights in the initial proceeding." Procedural errors in the
53. Removal of a child from the parents' custody based on an accusation that the
child was abused or neglected stigmatizes the parents and lowers their self-esteem. It is
a public statement that they have failed as parents. See Levine, supra note 12, at 21-22.
An appropriate remedy should announce that it was the state that failed.
54. This Note adopts the thesis developed in BEYOND THE BEsT INTERESTs, supra note
49, at 31, 40, 49, that placement decisions should attempt to achieve the custodial al-
ternative that is least detrimental to the child. Placement decisions should safeguard a
child's need for continuity of relationships, take into account a child's sense of time,
and recognize the law's incapacity to supervise interpersonal relationships and the in-
herent limitations of longrun predictions.
55. See, e.g., Boyns v. Department of Pub. Welfare, 360 Mass. 600, 276 N.E.2d 716
(1971) (parent sought writ of habeas corpus after state agency illegally deprived parents
of custody for one and one-half years); In re Daniel C., 47 A.D.2d 160, 365 N.Y.S.2d
535 (1975) (mother filed petition for habeas corpus after 27 months of illegal state custody).
56. See, e.g., Juvenile Appeal (Anonymous) v. Commissioner of Children & Youth
Servs., CONN. L.J., June 12, 1979, at 1 (Connecticut Supreme Court reversed judg-
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initial removal or continued detention of a child may also be raised
when the parents resist a state move to terminate their rights over
a child held in temporary care.57
The states differ widely on how the competing interests of parent
and child should be weighed in making a custody decision. Most
states continue to recognize the presumptive right of natural parents
to custody of their child.58 A minority of states have adopted the
view that custody decisions should be based solely on what dispo-
sition will serve the best interests of the child5 9 According to the
ment terminating parental rights and severing visiting privileges two years after entry of
initial order); In re Sanjivini K., 47 N.Y.2d 374, 391 N.E.2d 1316, 418 N.Y.S.2d 339 (1979)
(reversing ruling that terminated parental rights to 13-year-old child who had been with
prospective adoptive parents for 10 years).
57. See, e.g., In re Leon RR, 48 N.Y.2d 117, 397 N.E.2d 374, 421 N.Y.S.2d 863 (1979)(reversing order terminating parental rights to nine-year-old child who had been in foster
care with prospective adoptive parents for eight years).
58. See Note, Psychological Parents vs. Biological Parents: The Courts' Response to
New Directions in Child Custody Dispute Resolution, 17 J. FAM. L. 545, 548-51 (1979)
(21 states emphasize natural parents' presumptive right to child custody; 12 states have
moved substantially away from parental rights view, but have not fully embraced child-
focused view).
59. See id. at 550-51 (eight states have adopted best interests of child standard). Al-
though the family is entitled to constitutional protection, see notes 5-6 supra (citing cases),
the courts may award custody to foster parents in order to serve the child's best interests,
even when the original parents are fit. A finding that a child's foster parents have be-
come his or her psychological parents vitiates the biological parents' claim to protec-
tion for their familial relationship with the child. When the biological family is no
longer the psychological family, it is the psychological family that deserves constitutional
protection.
The Supreme Court addressed, but did not resolve, the question of whether foster
families have a constitutionally protected liberty interest in their survival as families in
Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 842-47
(1977). The Court stated that "the importance of the familial relationship, to the indi-
viduals involved and to the society, stems from the emotional attachments that derive
from the intimacy of daily association." Id. at 844. This suggests that the Court would
approve of a custody award to psychological parents when it would not be in the child's
best interests to be returned to his or her biological parents.
Some commentators, however, have incorrectly interpreted Quilloin v. Walcott, 434
U.S. 246 (1978), to indicate that the Court would be reluctant to approve terminations
of parental rights without a finding of parental unfitness. See Crouch, International
Convention Efforts and the Current Status of Children's Rights in the U.S.A., 6 FAsS.
L. REP. (BNA) 4023 (1980) (Supreme Court has expressly rejected use of best interests
standard to justify terminating rights of fit parents). The Court said in Quilloin:
[T]he Due Process Clause would be offended "[i]f a State were to attempt to force
the breakup of a natural family, over the objections of the parents and their chil-
dren, without some showing of unfitness and for the sole reason that to do so was
thought to be in the children's best interests."
431 U.S. at 255 (quoting Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality & Reform,
431 U.S. 816, 862-63 (1977) (Stewart, J., concurring)). Although the Court in Quilloin
clearly stated that functioning family units are constitutionally protected, this language
should not be construed to mandate a conclusive preference in favor of biological parents
over psychological parents. Indeed, Quilloin's holding negates such a conclusion. The
Court rejected the contention that an unwed father, absent a finding of unfitness, was
entitled as a matter of due process and equal protection to an absolute veto over adoption
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latter view, courts should not use custody decisions to redress wrongs
done to the parents or to punish wrongs committed by them.00
Regardless of the consideration accorded parents' interests in state
law, it is difficult for a court to decide that parents who undeservedly
have had their child wrested from them should not regain custody."'
This decision is particularly troublesome because there is no effec-
tive alternative remedy. If he or she does not return the child, the
judge has nothing to give the parents as justice.
The judge will try not to view his or her decision as a choice
between two evils. In order to reduce the mental discomfort that
such a dilemma causes, 62 the judge may misperceive or ignore facts.
Despite contrary evidence, he or she may deny that the violations
of the parents' rights led to the initial custody shift and refuse to
award custody to the parents.6 3 Alternatively, he or she may ignore
of his natural child. In reaching this result the Court emphasized that the father had no
psychological or financial relationship with the child at any time. The reference to
Justice Stewart's remarks in Smith was therefore mere dictum. Arbitrary state intrusion
into an intact natural family that serves the needs of both parents and children should
be unconstitutional. But this does not prohibit a state from serving the best interests
of the child if, for whatever reason, these mutually beneficial relationships cease to exist.
Constitutional due process does require, however, that the best interests standard be
clearly defined and narrowly construed when applied to terminate a parent's rights to
his or her child. See Chemerinsky, Defining the "Best Interests": Constitutional Protec-
tions in Involuntary Adoptions, 18 J. FAM. L. 79, 109-12 (1979) (adoptions without consent
of natural parents should be ordered only if there is significant likelihood that natural
parents will abuse or neglect child in future, or if child has stable psychological parent-
child relationship with adult who wishes to adopt, and when less drastic alternative
would not work).
60. The objection to this remedy-dispensing role for a court trying a custody case is
that the child is treated as damages. Cf. BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS, supra note 49, at
105-11 (when rights of parents and children conflict, children's rights are more deserving
of court's protection).
61. See In re Suzanne Y., 92 Misc. 2d 652, 662, 401 N.Y.S.2d 383, 390 (Fam. Ct. 1977)
("Where should the outrage generated by these circumstances be directed?")
62. Leon Festinger has termed this mental discomfort cognitive dissonance. He defines
it as "an antecedent condition which leads to activity oriented toward dissonance re-
duction just as hunger leads to activity oriented toward hunger reduction." L. FESTINGER,
A THEORY OF COGNITIvE DISSONANcE 3 (1957). Dissonance, or inconsistency, is psychologi-
cally uncomfortable and motivates a person to try to reduce the dissonance and achieve
consonance. Id. Fact-finding errors by judges in child custody cases have also been de-
scribed in psychoanalytic terms. See Burt, Forcing Protection on Children and Their
Parents: The Impact of Wyman v. James, 69 MiCH. L. REv. 1259, 1280 (1971) ("[C]ounter-
transference can ... be disabling for sensible judicial response to child abuse and neglect
cases.")
63. A recent case before the New Jersey Supreme Court, Sorentino v. Family & Chil-
dren's Soc'y, 72 N.J. 127, 367 A.2d 1168 (1976), illustrates this type of judicial self-deception.
Sorentino, a teenaged mother, voluntarily surrendered her newborn child to defendant
adoption agency with the understanding that she could recover her child within thirty
days. However, when the mother requested the child's return, the agency refused. An
agency supervisor then coerced her into signing a surrender agreement.
After some delay, caused largely by incorrect legal advice, Sorentino brought an action
692
Child Protection Workers
or misperceive the child's best interests and grant the parents' request
for custody.6 4
Returning the child to his or her parents is an inappropriate rem-
edy for violations of parents' and children's rights. It has some sym-
bolic value insofar as it provides official recognition that the parents
were treated improperly in the initial custody decision. In addition,
an award of custody provides parents the primary relief they seek.
But custody does not compensate the parents for the mental anguish
suffered during the separation or for the procedural violation. More-
over, a restoration of parental custody lacks any deterrent effect. Re-
to regain her child. The trial court found that the agency had obtained the mother's
consent through duress, that the surrender was a legal nullity, and ordered that the child
be returned to Sorentino. That order was stayed pending appeal.
On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the mother had not lost her right to custody,
and said that "[w]hile the prospective adopting parents [who by this time had had cus-
tody of the child for thirty-one months] have a great stake in this matter, their interests
are necessarily subordinate to the rights of the natural parents. They have been aware
of this litigation from its beginning." Id. at 131, 367 A.2d at 1170. The court refused
to order an immediate shift in custody, however, and remanded the case for a hearing
on whether restoring the child to the custody of the natural parents would seriously
harm the child.
On remand, the lower court decided that the child should remain with the foster
parents, and the natural mother appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed. 74 N.J. 313,
378 A.2d 18 (1977). It then went on to consider whether the natural parents' rights should
be terminated. At this point, the court appeared to discard the concern it had expressed
in its first opinion about the injustice done to the mother. The court spoke of "equivo-
cation and indecision on the part of the natural parents" and of the reliance that delay
had encouraged in the foster parents. Id. at 324-25, 378 A.2d at 24. The court also spoke
of the "frequent and competent counseling from an approved agency [that] was available
to Constance Sorentino," id. at 325, 378 A.2d at 24; counseling, that is, from the same
agency that had coerced her into signing a surrender order against her will. In sum,
once the court recognized that the child's best interests would be served by terminating
Sorentino's parental rights, it could no longer preserve its view that the natural mother
was faultless and victimized.
64. In In re Leon RR, 48 N.Y.2d 117, 397 N.E.2d 374, 421 N.Y.S.2d 863 (1979), the
New York Court of Appeals ordered that a nine and one-half-year-old boy, who had
lived for eight years with foster parents who wished to adopt him, should be returned
to his natural parents. This result was based in part on the conclusion that the child
protection agency had failed to maintain and strengthen the parent-child relationship
while Leon was in foster care. The parents had followed all the agency's suggestions on
how to improve their home life, but the agency
actually hindered [their] efforts to maintain contact with Leon and plan for his
future. Not only did it align itself with and encourage the expectations of the foster
parents who wished to adopt the child but, more egregiously, from the onset of
placement it actively sought to plant the seeds from which a finding of permanent
neglect might grow.
Id. at 126, 397 N.E.2d at 380, 421 N.Y.S.2d at 869. On the other hand, the court effec-
tively ignored the question of the child's best interests. It noted that a psychologist had
concluded two years earlier that Leon retained no affection for his natural parents but
disregarded the relevance of this finding to the appropriate custody determination. Cf.
Sees v. Baber, 74 N.J. 201, 377 A.2d 628 (1977) (in returning year-old child to mother
who had placed her privately for adoption at birth, court dismissed fears of psychological
harm to the child as not grounded in "ordinary experience").
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storing the child to his or her parents imposes no sanction on the
child protection agency and therefore creates no incentive for the
agency to prevent future procedural violations.
Most importantly, returning the child to his or her original par-
ents may not be in the child's best interests. If the child has begun
to relate to other caretakers as his or her psychological parents, shift-
ing custody a second time may result in serious and long-lasting harm
to the child.65 In sum, an award of custody fails to satisfy sufficiently
the criteria for an effective remedy for improper custody termination.,0
B. Actions for Damages
Parents and children who have been wrongfully separated cannot
recover meaningful damage awards under federal law from indi-
vidual child protection workers or their government employers. There
are also significant barriers to using state law to recover damages
for procedurally flawed custody decisions.
1. Federal Law
Under federal law, states cannot be held liable for unconstitutional
interferences with the parent-child relationship by child protection
workers. The Eleventh Amendment 67 bars any action against a state
in federal court.68 Although municipalities and counties may be held
liable for violations of constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,C9
65. See note 52 supra (repeated separations cause increasingly more severe psycho-
logical damage to child).
66. A fortiori, refusing the parents' request for custody is also an inadequate remedy.
Although this decision may be in the best interests of the child, it totally fails as com-
pensation, deterrence, or symbolic vindication.
67. U.S. CONsT. amend. XI ("The Judicial power of the United States shall not be
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one
of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any
Foreign State.")
68. The Eleventh Amendment literally excludes from the federal judicial power suits
by citizens of one state against another nonconsenting state. The Supreme Court has inter-
preted the amendment to forbid suits for damages in federal court against a state by
its own citizens. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890). For a discussion of the Eleventh
Amendment and actions against state officials in general, see P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D.
SHAPIRO, & H. NVECHSLER, HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL
SYSTEm 930-37 (2d ed. 1973).
69. Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of
the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation
of any rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper pro-
ceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976).
In Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978), the Court held that
Vol. 90: 681, 1981
Child Protection Workers
the challenged action must represent an official government policy
or custom.70 The Supreme Court has explicitly stated that a local
government cannot be held liable under section 1983 on a theory
of respondeat superior.71 Unsanctioned wrongdoing by a child pro-
tection worker will therefore not subject a local government em-
ployer to liability.
Individual child protection workers are liable to suit under sec-
tion 1983 for violations of parents' and children's constitutional
rights.7 2 Individual workers, however, commonly are judg-ment proof.73
Although the heads of child protection agencies are more likely to
possess sufficient assets to make a significant recovery possible, they
are unlikely to be held liable for the activities of their subordinates.7 4
2. State Law
At present, state law as well does not provide an adequate rem-
edy.7 5 As in the case of section 1983 actions against individual em-
ployees, it is difficult to collect significant damage awards from
individual child protection workers. Some states and municipalities
are protected from liability under state law by the doctrine of sov-
ereign immunity for governmental acts. 70 Even in states that have ab-
municipalities are "persons" for the purposes of section 1983. In Owen v. City of Inde-
pendence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980), the Court extended its ruling in Monell by holding that
municipalities are not entitled to good faith immunity.
70. Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978) (local govern-
ments liable under § 1983 only for an unconstitutional "official custom" or "policy").
71. Id. at 691-92.
72. See, e.g., Duchesne v. Sugarman, 566 F.2d 817 (2d Cir. 1977) (reversing order dis-
missing action for money damages under § 1983 for deprivation of due process in child
custody proceeding); McGhee v. Moyer, 60 F.R.D. 578 (W.D. Va. 1973) (complaint al-
leging deprivation of due process in emergency seizure of children states cause of action
under § 1983).
73. See R. SPURRIER, To PRESERVE THEsE RIGHTS 26-27 (1977) (doubtful that large
damage awards can be collected from low-paid state employees); Note, Damage Remedies
Against Municipalities for Constitutional Violations, 89 HARV. L. Rav. 922, 923 (1976)
(many officials lack financial means to pay substantial judgments).
74. Cf. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 377 (1976) (denying equitable relief under § 1983
when named defendant officials "played no affirmative part in depriving any members
of . . . respondent classes of any constitutional rights"). Moreover, executive officials
possess a limited good-faith immunity from liability under section 1983. Scheuer v.
Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974). The scope of this immunity expands with the scope of an
official's responsibilities. Id. at 247-48.
75. There is a common-law action against one who, by force or seduction, deprives
parents of their child's custody. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 700 (1976 & Supp.
1978). However, the remedy is seldom invoked. But see, e.g., Oversmith v. Lake, 295 Mich.
627, 295 N.W. 339 (1940) (affirming award of S150 in damages against county welfare of-
ficer and matron of juvenile detention home for seizing plaintiff's six children and re-
taining custody for 45 days).
76. Those functions and activities that can be performed only by government are
termed "governmental" in character, see W. PRossER, THE Law OF TORTS § 131, at 980
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rogated or limited this common-law immunity, governmental units
may not be liable for their agents' intentional torts.
77
Actions for money damages do not adequately compensate parents
and children who have been wrongfully separated. Even if state or
federal law permits recovery of money damages, the amount awarded
is likely to be paltry. Because child protection agencies and their
administrators are generally protected from liability, no systemic de-
terrence is achieved. In addition, the parents are accorded no sym-
bolic recognition that their rights have been violated. Finally, be-
cause current causes of action do not provide an adequate remedy
for the parents' injuries, courts are likely to use the child as dam-
ages even if restoring the child to the parents will be harmful to
the child .7
III. A Statutory Money Damages Remedy
Parents who have been wrongfully separated from their children
are entitled to some relief. An effective damages remedy would per-
mit courts to recognize and rectify, at least to some degree, the in-
jury suffered by the parents. At the same time, such a remedy would
permit courts in custody proceedings to focus exclusively on the best
interests of the child.
A. Proposed Legislation
To overcome the limitations of existing remedies for procedurally
defective custody terminations, states should enact legislation per-
mitting parents79 who have been wrongfully separated from their chil-
(4th ed. 1971) ("public charities, poor relief, and the care of dependent or defective
classes" are governmental in nature), and usually do not give rise to tort liability,
id. at 979.
77. Id. § 70, at 464 (master liable for intentional tort of servant only if its purpose
is to further master's business).
78. The argument that available damage remedies are inadequate can be applied to
various constitutional and statutory violations other than procedurally flawed custody
terminations. See R. SPum.ER, supra note 73, at 131 (remedies for constitutional torts
generally inadequate). But in no other context is a damages remedy necessary to ensure
that a judge does not use another human being as damages to compensate the victim
of a rights violation.
79. Both parents and children suffer when they are separated through defective pro-
cedures. Children are deprived of their constitutional right to family integrity, see note 6
supra, and they may suffer serious and long-lasting psychological harm, see notes 48-52
supra. In theory, therefore, the option of suing for damages for improper custody ter-
mination should be available to children as well as to parents. As a matter of practice,
however, parents are the most likely plaintiffs in such a suit. For that reason, this Note
emphasizes the case of a suit brought by the parents.
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drcn by child protection workers to recover damages from the state
or local government. Damages should be recoverable on a theory of
strict liability when child protection workers fail to comply with
statutorily mandated procedures or with state or federal guarantees
of due process., 0 Parents should be permitted to take advantage of
this remedy whether or not the procedural violation resulted in a
custody shift that was substantively incorrect.8 ' Although parents
generally prefer custody of their child to money, our legal system
commonly uses money as a substitute for irreplaceables .
2
The claim for damages should be heard separately from and sub-
sequent to any custody proceeding.8 3 In the custody proceeding the
court should focus exclusively on the question of what will serve
the best interests of the child. In the damages action the court should
focus on whether the parents were deprived of procedural rights
granted by a state statute or secured by the federal or state constitu-
tion, and award them some measure of relief if their rights were
violated.s 4 Distinct treatment of these two issues will promote hon-
esty and accuracy in factfinding by reducing judges' incentive to strain
to make the best interests of the child fit the rights of the original
parents.
The government employer rather than the individual child pro-
tection worker should be subject to liability. Holding the employer
liable would properly focus the deterrent effect on the administra-
tive structure. In order to protect itself from liability, the state would
improve its selection, training, and supervision of child protection
workers. The state would have the incentive to confine the indi-
vidual worker's discretion through detailed standards of conduct.
Moreover, making the state employer instead of the individual em-
80. Under the proposed remedy, the states could not avoid liability by showing due
care in administering a child protection system.
81. However, damages would not be available as compensation for a substantively
wrong custody loss that was procedurally correct. See p. 700 infra (goal of proposal is
to prevent substantively incorrect custody decisions by encouraging compliance with
procedural rules).
82. For example, money is used as compensation for lost limbs and lost lives. See W.
PROSSER, supra note 76, § 127 (every state now has a wrongful death statute).
83. The disposition in the custody action may well be relevant to assessing a measure
of damages. See notes 84, 89 infra. However, the resolution of the damage action should
have no bearing on the child's custody. See note 54 supra (custody hearing should be
governed by best-interests-of-child standard).
84. In assessing damages for procedural violations by child protection workers, the
major focus should be on compensating the victims. Damages in any particular case should
depend on such factors as the seriousness of the procedural violation and the degree of
actual injury suffered. For example, if the child has been irretrievably lost, courts may
award a higher damage figure than if parent and child were only temporarily separated.
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ployee liable would give parents greater assurance that damage judg-
ments will be satisfied. 5
The proposed damages action would meet all the criteria for an
adequate remedy. It would compensate parents for the loss of their
child; it would deter, on a system-wide basis, further violations of
parents' and children's rights; and it would provide a symbolic state-
ment that the state has violated the parents' right to fair procedures.
Most importantly, a separate damages remedy would promote the
best interests of the child because it would provide a remedy that
is an effective alternative to restoring custody to the parents.86
85. In addition, it would increase the likelihood of a significant damages award. Cf.
Note, supra note 73, at 923 (judges and juries may be unwilling to assess large damages
against individual worker).
86. A possible objection to this proposal is that the interests of parents, children, and
the state could be protected more effectively simply by providing for expedited judicial
review of flawed custody decisions. Appellate review of defective custody decisions could
ideally be carried out in a few days, and the child returned immediately to the parents.
The child therefore would not form any attachments to new caretakers and it would
likely be in the best interests of the child to return him or her to the parents.
Expedited appellate review is currently available in many states. See, e.g., MAss. ANN.
LAws ch. 119, § 27 (Michie/Law. Co-op Supp. 1980) (appeals session may advance time
for de novo review of adjudication of neglect). Speedy appellate review cuts down on
the number of cases in which procedurally defective custody decisions lead to eventually
permanent separations. However, even where expedited appellate review is generally
available, a statutory money damages remedy would still serve important functions.
First, restoration of the child to his or her parents following expedited appellate re-
view still undercompensates the parents because it merely restores the status quo, and
does not provide a remedy for the due process violation or for the period of separation,
however short. Moreover, it has little deterrent value. Although the child protection
worker's actions are scrutinized by a court, and subject to criticism if found to be in-
correct, such judicial proceedings are typically closed and the shame of public censure
is lacking. Moreover, appellate determinations do not have a systemic deterrent effect;
they do not place significant pressure on policymakers to improve the training and su-
pervision of child protection workers. This systemic deterrent is crucial given that the
turnover in individual workers is so high. See Campbell, supra note 34, at 643.
Extremely swift appellate review resulting in return of the child might have some
value as a symbolic affirmation that the parents were wronged by the state. However,
there are many cases in which the state takes children from their homes for a short
time, and for good cause, and returns them when the parents have agreed to correct
deficiencies in their homes. Judged against this background of practice, the quick return
of the child is of dubious value in obliterating the stigma that the initial removal created.
Also, the congestion of court calendars is not the major cause of delays between pro-
cedural violations and appellate review. Parents accused of neglect are almost invariably
poor and legally unsophisticated; they frequently view acquiescence as their only course.
Many children are placed in foster homes on a "temporary" basis for a long period of
time; until a permanent termination of parental rights is sought, the parents may be
reluctant to appeal. In cases involving the worst kinds of due process violations, the
parents are not given an initial adjudication from which to appeal.
Finally, the availability of expedited judicial review does not eliminate those cases in
which the removal of the child from the home, though procedurally flawed, is substan-
tively correct. In those cases, the existence of the money damages remedy is crucial not




B. Anticipated Criticisms and Responses
A number of potential objections may be raised to this proposal
and to the details of its implementation. None of these objections,
however, has sufficient merit to justify rejecting the proposal.
1. Unjust Compensation
One potential objection to the proposed statutory remedy is that
it would permit unjust enrichment of parents who either did not
care about losing their children or who deserved to lose them. For
example, parents who abused their child but whose custody was ter-
minated through improper procedures would be able to recover dam-
ages under this proposal. To avoid this result, recovery could be
limited to parents who could show both that their procedural rights
were violated and that the procedural error led to a custody deter-
mination that was substantively wrong.
Damages, however, should be awarded even if there has been only
a procedural violation.8 7 Although some parents would receive com-
pensation to which they have no moral claim, damages awarded to
such parents would deter future procedural violations.8" Overcom-
pensation is a price society should be willing to pay to increase the
likelihood that valid procedures will be followed. Moreover, the prob-
lem of overcompensation could be mitigated to some extent by in-
creasing or lowering the damages award depending on whether or
not the procedural violation led to a substantive error.8 9
2. Waste of Judicial Resources
It may also be argued that two separate proceedings, one to de-
cide custody issues and another to assess damages, would be an un-
necessary waste of judicial resources. The proceedings will often focus
87. In Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978), the Supreme Court held that only nominal
damages can be recovered in section 1983 cases when there are no actual injuries, and that
damages should not be presumed to flow from a procedural due process violation.
Failure to remedy constitutional torts undercompensates victims of official abuses, and is
counter to section 1983's deterrent role. See Note, Damage Awards for Constitutional
Torts: A Reconsideration After Carey v. Piphus, 93 HARV. L. Rav. 966, 980-85 (1980).
Accordingly, the deprivation of a due process right is an injury that should be compensated.
88. If child protection agencies were not held liable when parents are ultimately
found to have been neglectful or abusive, agencies would have less incentive to ensure
that proper procedures were always followed. There might be a tendency to gamble on
cases in which the parents were likely to be judged neglectful.
89. Thus, if a procedural violation led to permanent loss of custody, a parent would
receive a higher damage award than if the procedural violation did not result in the
loss of custody, either because the child was restored to the parents, or because the
parents would have lost the child in any event.
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on the same facts and involve the same litigants. For example, in the
custody hearing, the circumstances surrounding the child's removal
from the home would be relevant to the issue of where the child
will be placed. In the damages hearing, the resolution of the cus-
tody issue would be relevant in fixing the amount of damages.
Nevertheless, the proceedings should be kept distinct; the custody
proceeding is not the appropriate forum in which to remedy viola-
tions of parental rights. A court that hears evidence concerning the
unjust nature of the original termination could be reluctant to find
that the child's best interests will not be served by restoring cus-
tody. 0 Similarly, if the procedurally defective custody termination
was substantively correct, a judge could find it difficult to award
meaningful damages to the original parents. Thus, it is likely that
the custody and damages proceedings would infect each other if they
were combined. A formal separation of issues would help to ensure
that children are not used as damages and that parents are com-
pensated fully for violations of their rights.
3. Adverse Effects on Children
The most serious potential objection to the proposal is that the
threat of liability could deter child protection workers from acting
forcefully to help children, and that as a result children would be
harmed by negligent or abusive parents. This proposal, however,
should not have such a deterrent effect. In the first place, it does
not impose personal liability on the individual child protection
worker. Secondly, the proposal provides a cause of action for pro-
cedural violations, not for decisions that are substantively incorrect.
A child protection worker who removed a child from his or her
home would not subject the agency to liability if the decision to
intervene in the family were later determined to have been incor-
rect. Damages could be recovered only if procedural rights, such as
timely notice and opportunity for a hearing, were not accorded the
parents. The goal of this proposal is to prevent substantively incor-
rect custody decisions by encouraging compliance with procedural
standards.
Conclusion
More stringent procedural safeguards should be established to pre-
vent mistakes and abuses in child custody decisions. Regardless of
90. Cf. pp. 692-93 supra (judges in neglect cases may misperceive evidence in order
to reduce cognitive dissonance).
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the formal standards that are adopted, however, parents and chil-
dren will continue to be separated through proceedings that are
tainted with race and class prejudice, based on erroneous evidence,
or motivated by malice.
Custody of the child should not be used as damages to remedy
these wrongs. Instead, parents should be able to recover money dam-
ages when child protection workers fail to adhere to procedural stan-
dards mandated by state statutes or compelled by constitutional guar-
antees of due process. State legislatures should therefore enact a
statutory cause of action for parents whose children are improperly
removed from their custody by state agents.
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